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A Pattern Jury Instruction for Felony
Murder
Arthur A. Murphy*
I.

Introduction

The author recently drafted a new pattern jury charge on felony
murder for the manual of Pennsylvania suggested criminal jury instructions. A subcommittee appointed by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court prepared this manual and keeps it up-to-date.' The author
serves as reporter to this criminal instructions subcommittee and also
conducts a seminar-workshop on pattern instructions at The Dickinson School of Law. Members of this seminar made an important
contribution to the new charge: the students' research, drafts, and
memoranda supplied the author with a rich source of legal authorities and ideas. If approved by the subcommittee, the new charge will
be published as part of the next supplement to the manual of suggested instructions.
The purpose of this Article is to make this revised felony murder instruction, and a note that will accompany it, widely available
before regular publication. Judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel
may find the instruction and accompanying note useful. The revisions are certainly better than the manual's current versions.' Readers may discover substantive, procedural, or linguistic shortcomings
in the new material; the author and the subcommittee will be grateful for suggestions on how their work might be improved.
II.

Scope and Function of the Pennsylvania Pattern Instructions

The draft felony murder charge and subcommittee note may
seem excessively long and ambitious when compared with the skeletal "official" charges and barebones commentary used in many states
* Professor of Law, The Dickinson School of Law; B.S. 1946, United States Military
Academy; LL.B. 1952, Harvard Law School.
1. The subcommittee is a unit of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court Committee for Proposed Standard Jury Instructions. Judge Loran L. Lewis of the Court of Common Pleas, Allegheny County, is chairman of the subcommittee. The Pennsylvania Bar Institute publishes the
manual.
2. Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Criminal Jury Instructions, Instr. 15.2502B (Dec.
1980 Revision).
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and federal circuits.3 The reader can better decide whether the revisions are too comprehensive if he or she knows what the subcommittee conceives to be the proper scope and function of their product.
No all-purpose pattern charge can ever match an instruction
thoughtfully crafted by an unhurried, experienced judge for use during a particular trial - an instruction that incorporates the attorneys' valid requests for charge and is precisely tailored to the allegations, evidence, and law needed by the jury. The manual, whose
proper title is Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Criminal Jury Instructions, is only a resource; it is not a substitute for judicial creativity. The pattern instructions and the accompanying subcommittee
notes are intended to save the time of trial judges and attorneys, to
reduce the need for legal research and drafting, and to facilitate the
preparation of legally correct and easily understood jury instructions.
In routine cases, some judges may choose to employ the pattern instructions essentially unaltered, making only minimum changes to
shape the instructions to the particular case. Other judges, who prefer to concoct their own charges from scratch, may still find something worthwhile in the pattern instructions. These judges may treat
the patterns as a standard for comparison or as a place from which
to borrow felicitous language or ideas about arranging the constituents of a jury charge.
The subcommittee note to each instruction is designed to be a
piece of practical scholarship. The note explains how and when the
instruction should be used, and provides some basic information
about the area of law involved. The citation and discussion of legal
authority are intended (i) to enable the user to evaluate the correctness of the instruction; and (ii) to provide the user with guidance and
research leads that may assist in framing different or additional instructions, handling evidence questions, and dealing with other common issues. When important legal questions that are likely to confront a trial judge are unsettled, the subcommittee note attempts to
identify the issues and indicate possible answers.
III.

The New Instruction and Subcommittee Note

The author's draft of the revised instruction and subcommittee
note are presented below. The reader will notice that Pennsylvania
law retains two common law characteristics of felony murder that
are anathema to many scholars. The law imposes a quite strict and
3. See, e.g., CaliforniaJury Instructions, Criminal (CALJIC) (5th ed. 1988); Manual
of Model Jury Instructionsfor the Ninth Circuit (1984 ed.).
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vicarious type of liability for an unintended death, and apparently
continues to regard "malice" as an element that must be articulated
in jury charges. The author is not troubled by this traditional kind of
culpability and terminology. A person who commits one of the serious felonies enumerated in section 2502(b) of the Crimes Code4
ought to be treated severely if someone happens to be killed.5 The
element of "malice" that is common to first degree (premeditated),
second degree (felony), and third degree (other) murder can be explained to a jury in a concise, straightforward manner. In a case in
which all three degrees of murder are at issue, some jurors might
even find the culpability required for third degree murder more understandable if told that the specific intention to kill necessary for
first degree murder and the commission of a dangerous felony
needed for second degree murder are instances of malice. This sort
of linguistic justification for retaining malice as an element of first
and second degree murder is not terribly persuasive. Obviously the
word "malice" is not needed when instructing on either premeditated
or felony murder for a charge to be comprehensible; the difficulty is
that an instruction omitting "malice" may not be legally adequate in
Pennsylvania.7
A.

Revised Instruction

15.2502B(Crim) SECOND DEGREE MURDER
First Alternative: Defendant Felon Acting Alone
[(1) I'll start with some terminology and basic principles. The
more serious types of crimes are called felonies. For example, (robbery) (
) is a felony. Second-degree murder is often
called felony-murder because it is a killing connected with a felony.
(The felon need not intend to kill anyone or anticipate that anyone
be killed. The person killed can be someone other than a victim of
the felony. He need not die immediately; he may die much later and
at a different place.) (
-A
(2) You may find the defendant guilty of second-degree murder,
that is felony murder, if you are satisfied that the following three
elements have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt:
4. 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2502(b) (Purdon 1983).
5. See generally Crump & Crump, In Defense of the Felony Murder Doctrine, 8 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POLICY 359 (1985).
6. See PennsylvaniaSuggested Standard Criminal Jury Instructions, Instrs. 15.2501 A,
15.2502A, 15.2502C (Dec. 1988 Revisions).
7. See Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Criminal Jury Instructions, Instr. 15.2501A,
p. 3 of subcom. note (Dec. 1988 Revision).
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First, that the defendant

(killed)

(caused the death of)

Second, that the defendant did so while (committing) (attempting) (fleeing after committing) (fleeing after attempting) a certain
(robbery) (
); and
Third, that the defendant was acting with malice. You can presume that the defendant was acting with malice if you are satisfied
beyond a reasonable doubt that he (committed) (attempted)
the (robbery)
(
). Because
(robbery)
(
) is a crime inherently dangerous to human life,
there does not have to be any other proof of malice.
[(3) I shall now define (robbery) (an attempt to commit robbery) (
):
.1
[(4) A defendant kills "while fleeing" if he does the act that
kills during his flight from the scene and there is no break in the
chain of events between the felony and the killing.]
Second Alternative: Killing by Defendant's Co-Felon
[(1) I'll start with some terminology and basic principles. The
more serious types of crimes are called felonies. For example, (robbery) (
) is a felony. Second-degree murder is often
called felony-murder because it is a killing connected with a felony.
When two people are partners in a successful or unsuccessful attempt to commit a felony and one of them kills a third person, both
partners may be guilty of felony-murder. (Neither partner has to intend to kill nor anticipate that anyone will be killed. The person
killed can be someone other than a victim of the felony. He need not
die immediately; he may die much later and at a different place.)

(,)
(2) You may find the defendant guilty of second-degree murder,
that is felony murder, if you are satisfied that the following four elements have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt:
First, that
(killed) (caused the death of)
Second, that
did so while he and the defendant
were partners in (committing) (attempting) a certain (robbery)

(.)

Third, that

the death of)

did the act that (killed) (caused

in furtherance of the (rob-

bery) (robbery attempt) (
); and
Fourth, that the defendant was acting with malice. You can
presume that the defendant was acting with malice if you are satis-
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fled beyond a reasonable doubt that he and
were
partners in (committing) (attempting) the (robbery)
(
). Because (robbery) (
)
is a crime inherently dangerous to human life, there does not have to
be any other proof of malice.
[(3) I shall now define (robbery) (an attempt to commit robbery) (
):
(4) Going back to the requirement that the defendant and
were partners in (committing) (attempting)

the (robbery) (
(I instruct you that they were partners if they were both principals or one of them was a principal and the other was an accomplice.
A person is a "principal" if he actually commits the crime or makes
the attempt himself. A person is an "accomplice" if he aids or encourages the principal to commit or to attempt the crime and does so
intending to get the principal to commit the crime or intending to
make it easier for the principal to commit it.)
(I instruct you that they were partners if they conspired to commit the [robbery] [
]. Two people "conspire"
to commit a crime if they share the intent that the crime be committed and they agree that one or both of them will commit it or that
one of them will help the other to commit it. Their agreement may
be express and verbal - they may actually talk about it. Or their
agreement may be an unspoken agreement that can be inferred from
their words and conduct and the surrounding circumstances. Each
knows what the other is thinking - they don't have to talk about it.)
(I instruct you that they were partners if

)

[(5) I shall now explain the meaning of the "in furtherance"
element:
(A partner's act that kills is not in furtherance of the felony if
the partner does the act for his own personal reasons that are independent of the felony.)
(A partner's act that kills is in furtherance of the felony if he
does the act while fleeing from the scene and if there is no break in
the chain of events between the felony and the act. However, even
though the partner's act that kills may seem to meet these requirements, it is not in furtherance of the felony if the partner does the
act for his own personal reasons which are independent of the felony
and the effort to flee.)
(.-
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B. Revised Subcommittee Note
SUBCOMMITTEE NOTE
When the defendant is charged with second degree murder in
violation of Crimes Code § 2502(b), the court will have to frame its
charge to correspond with the theory of the case: with whether the
defendant allegedly acted alone or with a co-felon, and if with a cofelon, with whether the defendant was a principal, accomplice, or coconspirator in the underlying felony and with whether his or the cofelon's act caused the death. The charge will have to be phrased
somewhat differently if the defendant acted with multiple co-felons
or if he is being tried jointly with confederates. The first ("single
felon") and second ("co-felon") alternative instructions are appropriate for two common situations and can readily be adapted to others.
The first is for a defendant who had no confederate. The second is
for a defendant whose co-felon caused the death.
Subdivision (1) of both instructions may be used if the court
wishes to begin with general remarks about the nature of felony
murder. The elements in subdivision (2) of both instructions will
have to be tailored to the case and will sometimes have to be supplemented. For example, as indicated in subdivision (3), the court must
at some point give the jury an adequate definition of the predicate
felony or attempt. The first element of subdivision (2) will have to be
augmented if there is a legal issue of whether the act of the defendant or co-felon was a direct cause of the victim's death. See Instruction 15.2501C (criminal homicide - causation). In the "co-felon"
alternative, the generic term "partners" will always have to be explained and the concept of "furtherance" may need elaboration; the
instructions contained in subdivisions (4) and (5) may serve these
purposes.
The rest of this subcommittee note contains additional information and suggestions that may be helpful in evaluating, tailoring, and
using either the "single felon" or "co-felon" alternative or in drafting an instruction for a situation not covered by them.
1. General
According to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the Crimes
Code has made no basic change in the law of felony murder. See,
e.g., Commonwealth v. Waters, 491 Pa. 85, 418 A.2d 312 (1980);
Commonwealth v. Allen, 475 Pa. 165, 379 A.2d 1335 (1977). The
"single felon" and "co-felon" instructions are derived from Crimes
Code § 2502(b) and (d) as amended by Act No. 39 (1978); Crimes
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Code § 306 (liability for conduct of another; complicity); and from
the case law cited in this subcommittee note. Although Crimes Code
§ 2502(b) defines second degree murder in terms of a "criminal
homicide," which Crimes Code § 2501(a) in turn defines to require
that the death was at least negligently caused by the defendant, the
accidental and vicarious aspects of the prior Pennsylvania felony
murder law are not altered, compare Commonwealth v. White, 490
Pa. 179, 415 A.2d 399 (1980) with Commonwealth v. Allen, supra.
2. Malice
Malice is conclusively presumed from a defendant's involvement
in a predicate felony, see Commonwealth v. Rawls, 328 Pa. Super.
469, 477 A.2d 540 (1984). This presumptive approach to malice has
been traditional in Pennsylvania, although for a time, some appellate
decisions seemed to be moving toward a permissive inference or rebuttable presumption approach, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Legg,
491 Pa. 78, 412 A.2d 1152 (1980) (felony murder rule allows finder
of fact to infer killing was malicious because actor engaged in a felony of such a dangerous nature to human life as one of the statutorily enumerated felonies); Commonwealth v. Allen, supra; Commonwealth v. Lee, 484 Pa. 335, 399 A.2d 104 (1979) (Larsen, J., opinion
in support of affirmance). Because malice is conclusively presumed,
the term malice is arguably superfluous in jury instructions. The
subcommittee, however, has cautiously retained the term when
describing the mens rea element in subdivision (2).
For felony murder, the felony must not be an afterthought, the
defendant must have the intent to commit the felony before the
homicidal act occurs, see Commonwealth v. Legg, supra.
3. Single Felon Alternative
A central problem in felony murder is how to express the connection that must exist between the defendant, the felony, and the
death. When the defendant is the lone felon, his act that leads to the
death (i) must occur while he is engaged in perpetrating the felony,
Crimes Code § 2502(b), and (ii) must be a direct cause of the death,
see subcommittee note to Instruction 15.2501(c); Commonwealth v.
Evans, 383 Pa. Super. 118, 494 A.2d 383 (1985). There is no requirement that the defendant's homicidal act be in furtherance of
the felony. The "in furtherance" requirement applies only when a
defendant has a co-felon and the co-felon is the slayer, see Commonwealth v. Mease, 357 Pa. Super. 366, 516 A.2d 24 (1986).
With regard to the requirement that the defendant do the fatal
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act while he is perpetrating the felony, section 2502(d) defines perpetrating as committing or attempting the felony or fleeing thereafter. In determining whether a killing should be regarded as during
flight, the courts look for unity of time, place, and purpose between
the felony and the death. They employ concepts of "no break in the
chain of events,.... fresh pursuit," and "flight from the scene," see
Commonwealth v. Barkley, 335 Pa. Super. 384, 484 A.2d 189
(1984) (on facts, killing was not during flight). Subdivision (4) of
the "single felon" instruction is derived from Barkley. Barkley's
summary of the law regarding flight is still valid even though the
case was overruled on procedural grounds by Commonwealth v.
Smith, 518 Pa. 524, 544 A.2d 943 (1988).
4. Co-Felon Alternative
The problem of expressing the required connection between the
defendant, the felony, and the death presents greater conceptual and
linguistic difficulties when the slayer is a co-felon rather than the
defendant himself. Crimes Code § 2502(b) defines second degree
murder in terms of complicity: a homicide committed while defendant was engaged as a principal or accomplice in the perpetration of a
felony. Section 2502(d) defines perpetration as:
The act of the defendant in engaging in or being an accomplice in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight
after committing or attempting to commit robbery, rape . ...

The courts have read the co-conspirator rule into § 2502(b). For example, according to Commonwealth v. Waters, supra, a person other
than the slayer, cannot be guilty of felony murder unless a conspiratorial, i.e., a common, design to commit the underlying felony exists
when the slaying occurs and the slayer's act causing death is in furtherance of the felony.

4a. Complicity, Conspiracy
The Pennsylvania courts have tended to mingle the complicity
and co-conspirator theories and sometimes appear to equate their
scopes of liability. The subcommittee, however, has written subdivisions (2) and (4) of the co-felon instruction on the assumption that
the two theories, while they overlap, are distinct and not identical in
scope of liability. The term "partners" is used as a convenient ge-

neric to refer to both a complicitous or conspiratorial relationship
with regard to the felony. Depending upon the facts of the case and

the theory or theories relied on by the Commonwealth and the defense, the court may use either the suggested complicity or conspir-
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acy definition of partners in subdivision (4) or it may use both definitions, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hassine, 340 Pa. Super. 318, 490
A.2d 438 (1984) (judge's charge based on an "accomplice theory"
held proper); Commonwealth v. Orlowski, 332 Pa. Super. 600, 481
A.2d 952 (1984) (sufficiency of evidence for murder separately evaluated under accomplice and co-conspirator theories). If feasible, the
court should choose a single theory; the instructions will be shorter
and more easily understood by the jurors. The instructions in subdivision (4) may require change or elaboration in some cases, for example, if there is an issue of whether the defendant terminated his
complicity or withdrew from the conspiracy to commit the predicate
felony before the putative co-felon did the fatal act, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lee, 484 Pa. 335, 399 A.2d 104 (1979) (Larsen, J.,
opinion in support of affirmance; defense of abandonment and withdrawal); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 336 Pa. Super. 1, 485 A.2d 397
(1984) (requirements for effective withdrawal). For ideas on possible
modifications to subdivision (4) see Instructions 8.306A (liability for
complicity) and 8.306C (co-conspirator liability). For more ideas,
see Commonwealth v. Prosdocimo, 331 Pa. Super. 51, 479 A.2d
1073 (1984) (scope of complicitous or conspiratorial agreement; did
agreement to "rip off" include agreement to rob?); Commonwealth
v. Olds, 322 Pa. Super. 442, 469 A.2d 1072 (1984) (how can agreement or shared intent be proven? general evidentiary principles).
4b. Perpetration,Furtherance,Causation
In a case in which a co-felon is the slayer, Crimes Code §
2502(b) and the case law employ concepts of "while perpetrating,"
"in furtherance," and "direct" causation to state the temporal and
causal connections that must exist between the defendant's complicitous or conspiratorial behavior regarding the felony, the act of the
co-felon, and the death.
The most easily stated of the connections is the requirement
that the co-felon's homicidal act was a direct cause of the death. It is
not so easy to formulate all-purpose definitions of the "while perpetrating" and "in furtherance" requirements for a pattern jury instruction. For some situations, e.g., killings during flight, these requirements tend to be amorphous or redundant. Consider the
following case: The evidence shows that the defendant robbed a convenience store while his confederate waited at the wheel of the getaway car. When the defendant emerged pursued by an armed clerk,
the frightened confederate raced off leaving the defendant at the
curb. Two miles down the road the confederate struck and killed a
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pedestrian. How should the judge instruct on the "while perpetrat-

ing/while fleeing" and the "in furtherance" requirements? If the
judge simply quotes Crimes Code §§ 2502(b) and (d), he is likely to
confuse or mislead the jury.
Quaere: To what extent should a judge try to make the concepts
of perpetration and furtherance specific and to what extent should he
allow the jurors to give them meaning, the jury in effect making a
community judgment whether on the facts, it is just to hold the defendant accountable for the death?
In wording the second and third elements of subdivision (2), the
subcommittee made two choices: (i) The phrase "in furtherance of
the felony" is used instead of other formulations that appear to be
used interchangeably in many appellate decisions, such as "in furtherance of 'the common design,' 'the shared intent,' or 'the conspiracy' to commit the felony," see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Waters,
supra; Commonwealth v. Johnson, supra; (ii) a killing by a co-felon
during the flight stage should be dealt with as presenting an issue of
whether the killing was in furtherance of the felony. Cf. Commonwealth v. Johnson, supra.
The Pennsylvania appellate courts have used various concepts
and principles for describing when a killing by a co-felon during the
attempt, commission, or flight stage is "in furtherance of the felony."
Some of them are:

(a) There must be unity of time, place, and purpose between the
felony and the act by the co-felon that kills or causes death, see, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Johnson, supra; Commonwealth v. Olds, supra.
(b) A homicidal act by a co-felon is not in furtherance of the
felony if it is an independent act not directed towards carrying out
the felony, see Commonwealth v. Olds, supra.
(c) The killing must be foreseeable; it must be the probable consequence of the criminal scheme. The defendant should have known
that someone could be killed, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Johnson,
supra. Quaere whether "in furtherance" issues should be submitted
to juries in terms of foreseeability. The subcommittee believes they
generally should not. The subcommittee relies on those appellate decisions that treat foreseeability as part of the rationale justifying imputed liability and as a judicial test for determining the legal sufficiency of evidence rather than as an appropriate jury standard for
felony murder, compare Commonwealth v. Olds, supra, with Commonwealth v. Johnson. Jurors could easily misunderstand a foreseeability standard and interpret it to call for more demanding require-
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ments for felony murder than the law actually imposes.
Justice Flaherty, concurring and dissenting in Commonwealth v.
Waters, supra, disapproved charging juries that a defendant may be
found guilty of felony murder only if the homicide committed by his
co-felon was "in furtherance of" the felony. He believed that the "in
furtherance" test cluttered the issue. Justice Flaherty proposed a
jury charge that would make all felons responsible for any killing
resulting from the energy of the felonious undertaking, see 418 A.2d
312, 319.
Subdivision 5 of the second alternative (co-felon) instruction includes two partial explanations of the "in furtherance" element that
may be useful for some cases. The first (personal reasons) explanation is derived from Commonwealth v. Olds, supra. The second (unbroken flight - personal reasons) explanation is derived from Commonwealth v. Johnson, supra and Commonwealth v. Barkley, supra.
Sometimes, there may be a question of whether the co-felon's
homicidal act occurred during the commission (attempt) stage of the
felony or during the flight. Such questions ordinarily can be dealt
with easily since the problem is generally one of phraseology rather
than true substance, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 343
Pa. Super. 154, 494 A.2d 402 (1985) (because of the Crimes Code's
definition of robbery, a killing during flight after a theft converts the
theft to robbery and constitutes felony murder).
5. Miscellaneous
Although the subcommittee found no pertinent cases decided
under the Crimes Code, it seems that there can be felony murders
other than those involving the felonies enumerated in section
2502(b). Such felony murders would be murders of the third degree,
see Crimes Code 2502(c); Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486,
137 A.2d 472 (1978). It also seems that a jury has the power to find
the defendant guilty of third degree murder as a lesser offense even
though the defendant is charged with and the only evidence establishes, a killing committed in perpetrating a section 2502(b) felony;
the trial judge apparently must so instruct the jury, see Commonwealth v. McNeal, 456 Pa. 394, 319 A.2d 669 (1974) (the second
degree murder referred to in McNeal is now third degree). Cf. Commonwealth v. Olds, supra. But see the discussion in the subcommittee note to Instruction 15.2501B of the trend away from instructing
on lesser homicides not raised by the evidence.
For general discussions of the felony murder doctrine, its content, history, and rationale, see Commonwealth ex rel Smith v. My-
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ers, 438 Pa. 216, 261 A.2d 555 (1970); W.R. LaFave and A.W.
Scott, Jr., Criminal Law § 7.5 (felony murder) (2d ed. 1986); D.
Crump and S.W. Crump, In Defense of the Felony Murder Doctrine, 8 Harv. J. of Law & Public Policy 359 (1985).

